C. A. Davis et al v. Lavell Kemp and Bryce Cheney : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1954
C. A. Davis et al v. Lavell Kemp and Bryce Cheney :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moss & Hyde; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Davis v. Kemp, No. 8148 (Utah Supreme Court, 1954).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2161
REor:-~·:, ... D_ 
- t;.J l/ ,j .. ~-
liPl_Ll.. · 
..... 
\ 
U. ot U~ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH , 
F lf T ·~ D-li L JL.:J 
C. A. DAVIS:, dba C. A. DAVIS C·O., MAY 2 !l 1954 
and CHARLES- MONT MAHONE-Y,_ ---------
STANFORD· MAHONEY, and J. ~· Clerk, Su-;,~~-;;-c;~~~·u~~- .... ..u 
MAHONEY, dba Red Cedar Mill · 
Company, a copartnership, 
Plaintiffs oorJ Resplorl)fle'IJ'J).ts, 
-vs.-
LAVELL KE·MP and BRYC:E 
CHENEY, dha Lost River Sawmill 
Company, a copartnership, 
DefenflOJYI).ts 01nfl Ap_p~elloots. 
APPELLANT'S BRIE·F 
MOSS & HYD·E: 
Case No. 8148 
Attorneys for Defe,nd~ts ~d 
A pp
1
ell011'1At 
65 East F'ourth South Stre'et 
S-alt liake City, Utah 
Received two copie'S this ......................................... 'day of 
.................................................................... , 1954 . 
. . ---------... -.... ---------------------------------.... --......................... -
Atto~neys for Plaintiffs aYn)fl Respovnclents 
. _ ; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
PAGE 
Statement of Facts ------------- ___________ -------------------------------------- 1 
Statement of Points ------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
Argumen·t _________________________________________________________________ --------··· __ 5 
Point I. THE DEFENDANT LAVELL KEMP wAs 
DISCHARGED FROM LIABILITY ON THE 
PARTNERSHIP DEBT. 
C·o,ncl usion .. _______________ . ___________________ ------··--------------....... _________ .. 15 
TABLE OF' CASES 
Lenger v. Hulst, 244 N. W. 187, 259 Mich. 640 ............ 13, 14 
STATUTES 
48-1-33 Utah Code Annotated 1953................................ 6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE .SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
C. A. DAVIS, dha C. A. DAVIS C·O., 
and CHARLES MONT MAHONEY, 
STANFORD MAHONEY, and J. J 1• 
MAHONEY, dba R.ed Cedar Mill 
C·ompany, a copartnership, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
LAVELL KEMP ~and BRYCE 
CHENEY, dba Lost River Sawmill 
Company, a copartnership, 
Defendamts and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S. BRIEF 
Case No. 8148 
STATEMENT OF· F·ACTS 
The plaintiffs, Mahoney and C. A. Davis, brought 
this action to recover $1,600.00 lent to the defendant R·ed 
Cedar Mill Company, a partnership, on September 26, 
1950. The defendant, La Veil Kemp, filed an answer al-
leging that there had been a novation between the plain-
tiffs, the defendants, and one G. E. Blackburn. 
The defendant ~also set up a counterclaim against 
the plaintiffs for conversion of a caterpillar tractor, re-
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suiting in the destruction of the busines~ sold to Black-
burn and the resultant loss to the defendants of their 
contract with Blackburn. 
The defendant appeals solely from the judgment of 
the Court 'as it relates to the plaintiffs' complaint and 
consequently will limit his statement of facts and argu-
ment to the judgrnent rendered in favor of the plaintiffs 
on their complaint. 
In the midd,le part of September, 1950, the plain-
tiffs were operating a planing mill in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. At that time they were having considerable diffi-
culty obtaining rough-cut lumber for their pl,aning mill. 
( Tr. p~. 11-12.) 
They learned of the fact that Kemp and Cheney 
were operating a mill in Idaho, and they went there to 
see whether or not they could tie up, the defendants' pro-
duction of rough-cut lumber. The trucker who had ad-
vised them of Kemp's operation also told them that Kemp 
needed money to purchase a larger tractor to handle the 
logs needed for his saWinill operation. The plaintiff'S saw 
an opportunity here to obtain an additional source of 
lumber to supply their customers and immediately called 
Kemp on the telephone and discussed with him the possi-
bility of lending money to the partnership· in exchange 
for an agreement to supply them with lumber. It was 
subsequently agreed between the defendant partnership. 
and the pl'aintiffs that the plaintiffs would lend $2,000.00 
to the defendants to purchase the tractor 'and that the 
defendants would deliver to the plaintiffs lumber in pay-
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ment of this obligation. The amount of the loan was to 
be repaid within sixty days from the 26th of September, 
1950. The partnership was able to pay $287.00 on the 
obligation. The plaintiffs actually only delivered $1600.00 
of the $2,000.00 they had agreed to lend the defendants 
and there was consequently due $1,313.00 on November, 
1950. Due to difficulties the defendants were unable to 
produce and deliver the lumber n:s agreed, and in the 
fall of 1950 the defendants decided to dissolve their part-
nership, and it was agreed between them that the defend-
ant Kemp would wind up the business and obtain ~a pur-
chaser. In the winter of 1951 defendant Kemp obtained 'a 
prospective purchaser in the person of G. E. Blackburn, 
who agreed to purchase the sawmill and equipment; and 
on the 8th of June, 1951, Kemp and Blackburn made a 
memorandum of their ;agreement. (Exhibit 8) 
The plaintiffs were then advised by Kemp that he, 
had sold the business to Blackburn and that Blackburn 
had assumed the obligations and would make arrange-
ments to pay them. In the summer of 1951 Blackburn 
was unable to set the mill in operation because of the 
fact that the plaintiffs had removed the tractor and 
secreted it in an equipment yard in Salt Lake City. The 
season was spent in attempting to locate this tractor. 
Blackburn inquired of the plaintiff Mahoney, who had 
taken the tractor fro1n Mack1ay, Idaho, whether or not he 
knew \vhere the tractor was, and Mahoney denied having 
any knowledge of where the tractor was. 
"Q. Mr. Blackburn came and asked you about the 
tractor, wliere it was, didn't he~ 
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A. He did. 
Q. And you told him you didn't lrnow where it 
was, didn't you~ 
A. That's right. I felt he had no right, no re'ason 
to inquire. 
Q. You told him you had never seen any such 
tractor, isn't that right~ 
A. I told him I didn't know where it was. 
Q. You did know where it was, didn't you~ 
A. Yes, I did." (Tr. 56-57) 
The tractor was not located by Blackburn until after 
the season was over; consequently, the business produced 
no lumber during the summer of 1951. In ApTil of 1952 
the defendant Kemp invited Mr. Blackburn and the plain-
tiffs to ·his home to discuss the n1atter of the obligation 
and to make sure that there would be no further liability 
on his part. At tbis meeting the plaintiffs were again 
advised that Blackburn had purchased the busines'S and 
assumed the obligations, and the plaintiffs entered into 
a new agreement with Blackbur11 to pay the obligation by 
delivering to them 17,000 feet of lu1nber. They granted 
Blackburn until June to deliver this lumber in satisfac-
tion of the debt. Thereafter, "\vithout any notice to Kemp, 
they extended the obligation for another month. Black-
burn, because of technical difficulties, was unable to 
deliver the lu1nber as agreed; and in the winter of 1952 
died in an aircraft accident. No attempt was m·ade to 
collect this obligation from Kemp until after the de·ath 
of Blackburn. 
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The lower court found in favor of the plaintiffs and 
against the defendant and entered judgment on the plain-
tiffs' complaint in the amount of $1556.11, and it is from 
this judgment that the defendant, Lavell Kemp, appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT LAVELL KEMP WAS DISCHARGED 
FROM LIABILITY ON THE P ARTNER.SHIP DEBT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT LAVELL KEMP WAS DISCHARGED 
FROM LIABILITY ON THE PARTNERSHIP DEBT. 
At Corrrrnon Law a retiring p'artner was never dis-
charged from a partnership obligation unless there was a 
novation between himself, the new partner, and the credi-
tor. This required an agreement between the debtor and 
the person assuming the debt and also the express con-
sent of the partneT'ship creditor to look to the person 
assuming the debt for payment and would release the old 
debtor from liability as an original obligor or as a surety 
on the obligation. 
Great confusion in the cases arose over the question 
of when a novation had occurred by reason of the conduct 
of the parties, 'and what conduct indicates a novation and 
what does not. 
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Recognizing the extremely unsati·sfactory state of 
the law, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform L~aws approved a provision in the Uniform 
Partnership Act which atte1npts to solve the problem of 
when 'a novation occurs and the old debtor is discharged. 
This Act was passed by the Legislature of Utah, and the 
pertinent ~section dealing with the problem of the dis~ 
charge of a former partner from liability for partnership 
debts· reads as follows : 
"Where a person agrees to assume the exist-
ing obligations of a dissolved partnership·, the 
partners whose obligations have been a;ssumed 
shall he discharged from any liability to MY credi-
tor of the partnership who, knowing of the 'agree-
ment, consents to a material alteration in the na-
ture or time of pay1nent of such obligations." (48-
1-33 (3) Utah Code Annotated 1953) 
With this controlling statute in mind, let us see if 
the facts of this case are such that the defendant was dis-
charged from liability on the partnership· debt. There 
are four elements in this statute: 
1. That the partnership be dissolved. 
2. That so1ne one agrees to assume the debts 
of the p.artnershi p·. 
3. That the creditor know of this agreement 
to assume the debts of the partnership, and 
4. That the creditor consents to a material 
alteration in the nature or time of p-ayment of such 
debt. 
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All of these elements are present in this ease, and the 
defendant, Kemp, was therefore discharged of liability 
on the partnership debt to the plaintiffs. Let us examine 
the record. 
The defendant, Kemp, testified that the partnership 
was dis~solved in the winter of 1950: 
"Q. All right. Now in the winter of 1950 did you 
·and your partner, Bryce Cheney, dissolve this 
partnership·? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. And did you agree. to wind it up and get a 
sale for the business~ 
A. That's right. I was to find a sale for it." 
(Tr. 83, 84) 
The loan was 1nade in the summer of 1950 nnd was 
an existing debt of the partnership at the: time of dissolu-
tion. 
The defendant, Kemp, did obtain a buyer for the 
business in the person of Garth E. Blackburn of Logan, 
Utah, who agreed to assume and pay the partnership 
debts. Kemp testified as follows: 
"Q. Did you find a sale for it? 
A. I did. 
Q. And who agreed to buy the business~ 
A. Garth E. Blackburn from Logan. 
Q. What was he to pay you for the business? 
A. Fifty-five hundred dollars, fifty-three hun-
dred dollars. 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. And was he to. assume the obligations of the 
business~ 
A. Yes, that's right. 
* • • 
Q. He agreed to assume the obligations of the 
business~ 
A. T·hat's right. I told him of the obligation's, 
who I owed money to and told him that I 
didn't want a thing out of it until these obli-
gations were all paid and he agreed to pay 
them." (Tr. 84) 
The fact of the sale to Blackburn and of his agree·-
ment to assume the partnership debts was made known 
to the plaintiffs by Kemp. In the sp·ring of 1952 the de-
fendant, Kemp, invited the plaintiffs and Garth Black-
burn to his. home for the purpose of making certain that 
all parties understood about the sale to Blackburn and 
that Blackburn was to pay off the partnership debts. 
Charles (Mont) Mahoney, Carl Davis, Garth Blackburn, 
and Kemp were all present. There ·all the· facts were 
placed before the plaintiffs, and they agreed to accept 
p'ayment from Blackburn, who was to pay the de·bt by 
delivering lumber to the plaintiffs. 
"A. I told them that the mill had been sold and 
that they had been after me to pay the obliga-
tion. They wanted lumber. I told them I 
was out of the lrunber business. I had been 
and they knew it before that. I wanted them 
all there and have him, have it fixed 'SO Mr. 
Blackburn would take over the obligation and 
p·ay it off beeause I couldn't supply any more 
lumber. 
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Q. And was this suggestion agreeable with them~ 
A. Yes Sir." ( Tr. 84-85) 
* • • 
"Q. What did Blackburn say~ 
A. He said he would p·ay it off. 
Q. How~ 
A. By lumber, seventeen thousand feet, I think, 
was the exact amount ... 
Q. And what did Mr. Mahoney and Mr. Davis 
say regarding this seventeen hundred feet of 
lumber~ 
A. Well they agreed, tliey agreed that that was 
what they said then. In other words, they 
said that that was satisfactory with them 
and that if he went ahead and paid it off. 
Q. Now did you advise them that your expected 
to be released from the obligation~ 
A. I sure did. That was one thing that was 
stressed very strictly and I told them that this 
obligation after this meeting and that was 
the object of the meeting and I think they all 
knew it." (Tr. 86-87) 
* * * 
"Q. And did they say whether or not they would 
release you~ 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. Did they say they would or would not~ 
A. They said they would in order to get the 
lumber. I was out of the lumber business and 
I told them I was out of the lumber business, 
I couldn't support them or supply them with 
any lun1ber and they wanted lumber. That 
was what they were in teres ted in, to keep 
their mill going." ( Tr. 87) 
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The final element of the statute is that the creditor, 
after learning of the dissolution of the partnership and 
that some one had assumed the debts of the partnership 
either materially alters the nature or tim.e of p1aymer~~.t 
of the debt. 
There can be no question but that the pl'aintiffs in 
this case consented to both a material alteration the na-
ture of the payment to be made -and also extended and 
changed the- time of p~ayment. 
The loan was made to the Lost River Sawmill Com-
pany in the middle of September 1950. (Tr. 13) The loan 
was to be repaid within sixty days. At the time the plain-
tiffs met at the home of the defendant, Kemp, with Mr. 
Blackburn to discuS's the payment of the loan, it wa;s al-
ready more tha;n. a ye:ar past d1~te! (Tr. 84) 
After discussing the sale to Blackburn and the 
method of Blackburn's pa;ying this obligation, they made 
an entirely new 'arrangement with Blackburn under the 
terms of which it was agreed that Blackburn would de-
liver to their mill seventeen thousand feet of lumber, 
and the plaintiffs would consider the debt p~aid. 
The original obligation called for payment by de-
livering lumber to be paid for one half in cash and one 
half in lumber credited on the obligation. The original 
amount of credit allowed on the obligation was $.55.00 per 
1,000 feet of lumber delivered. (See Exhibit 5) The na-
ture of pay1nent was materially changed in the: new agree-
ment with Blackburn. . 
10 
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After some discussion and bargaining the plaintiffs 
agreed to take 17,000 feet of lumber in satisfaction of the 
obligation plus interest. The oblig·ation then amounted to 
$1,313.22 principal and legal interest in the amount of 
approximately $124.71. This would leave a total balance 
of $1,437.93. They thus agreed with Blackburn to credit 
the account at the rate of $84.58 per 1,000 feet instead of 
$55.00 per 1,000 feet as they had heretofore agreed with 
Kemp and Cheney. 
Not only was the nature of p'ayment changed in the 
new agreement with Blackburn, the new owner of the 
business, but the time of payment was materially changed. 
At the time of the meeting at the Kemp house, the ac-
count was already more than a year past due. The plain-
tiffs made a new agreement to take lumber in p'ayment 
and extende·d the obligation to June of 1952. Carl A. 
Davis, one of the joint venturers in the plan to tie up 
Lost River Sawmill Lumber, testified 'as follows: 
BY MR. HYDE: 
"Q. Mr. Davis,. referring to this meeting at Mr. 
Kemp's home in the spring of 1952 and Mont 
M·alloney and Mr. Kemp and Mr. Blackburn 
were present, do you know the occasion that 
I am referring to~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Kemp advise you of the dissolution 
of their partnership and of the S'ale of the 
business to Mr. Blackburn~ 
A. I had been advised of the dissolution of the 
partnership some time prior to this. 
11 
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Q. Oh, you had been~ 
A. I had. 
Q. And the matter was discussed of the sale to 
Mr. Blackburn, is that true~ 
A. Comments were made about it. I don't think 
there was much of a discussion entered into. 
Q. Well you were aware of it, were you not~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now this obligation was due and payable at 
the time of the n1eeting, wasn't it~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you concur with what Mr. Mahoney 
'has testified about, about the extension of the 
obligation until June of that year to allow 
Mr. Blackburn to get the 'seventeen thousand 
feet of lumber down to you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then it was re-extended until JUly~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now the agreement you had with Mr. Kemp 
and Mr. Cheney was that payment would be 
made only half in lumber, isn't that true~ 
Half of the lumber delivered~ 
A. Ye:s. 
Q. And the agreement 1nade with Mr. Blackburn 
was that no cash would be paid for the lum-
ber; all of the lumber would apply on the 
obligation, is that true~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now when was the second agreement in de-
fault~ I refer to the agreement for Black-
burn to deliver the lumber~ 
12 
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A. Well Mr. Blackburn agreed with Mr. Kemp 
that he would bring down two loads of lum-
ber in equal amounts of eighty-five hundred 
feet. That was the capacity he could haul 
in his truck and the first load to have been 
delivered in May, approximately the 15th, 
and the second load approximately a month 
later and they weren't forthcoming, two loads 
instead of one." (Tr. 76-77) 
We consequently have not only one extension of the 
obligation to June, 1952, but a later extension that Kemp 
had no knowledge of to July, 1952. 
One of the leading cases under the provision of the 
Partnership Act which bears on the case before this 
Court is the case of Lenger v. Hulst, 244 N.W. 187; 259 
Mich. 640. In that case the plaintiff creditor made a loan 
to a partnership during the time when the defendant 
Hulst was a partner. Hulst later sold his interest in the 
partners·hip to one Hollemans. 
At the time of this sale Hulst notified the plaintiff 
that he was selling to Hollemans. The plaintiff formally 
notified Hulst that this would not release him from the 
obligation. In answer to the letter from Hulst notifying 
them that he had sold out to Hollemans, they replied by 
return mail : 
"In reply to the notice ... we wish to go on 
record to the effect that this company does not 
intend to release either of the partners ... from 
the joint and several liability which they now have 
... to the undersigned company ... " 
Lenger v. Hulst, 244 N.W. 187 at p. 188. 
13 
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The lower court held that because of this notice of 
their intention to hold Hulst after notice of the sale that 
there was no novation and Hulst was therefore not dis-
charged by the sale to Hollemans. The Supreme Court 
of Michigan reversed the trial court and held that Hulst 
was discharged regardless of the intention of the plain-
tiffs not to release him from his liability on the obliga-
tion. In reversing the lower court and entering judgment 
for the defendant, the court discus'Sed at length the argu-
ment made successfully to the tr±al court that the de-
fendant is not discharged unle'Ss the plaintiff agreed or 
intended such a result. They said: 
"We think it cannot be held that the plaintiff, 
by seTving the· quoted notice, could avoid the ex-
press statutory provision. Neither dissolution of 
the p'artnership nor the assumption of the part-
nership obligations by Hollemans released defend-
ant from liability on partnership debts; but he 
was released, when, without his consent or ac-
quie'Scence in any way, plaintiffs by renewals of 
each of these notes. extended the time within which 
the obligations were payable and could be en-
forced, OJYI;,d in this m.anner ma,terially altere,d 
the nature of the obligation . .. until plaintiff vol-
untarily extended the time within which each of 
these notes were payable., payment could have 
been enforced against defendant. Plaintiffs were 
charged with knowledge of the law, 'and, if they 
saw fit to grant to Hollemans an extension of time 
within which p·ayment could be made without ob-
taining defendant's consent or acquiescence in any 
way, they did so subject to the provision'S of the 
quoted statute and thereby discharged the defend-
ant from his former obligation." 
14 
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Lenger v. Hulst, 244 N.W. 187 at p. 188. 
In the case before this Court, no notice of intention 
to hold Kemp was given. Ken1p called the meeting for 
the express purpose of clarifying the picture and of m'ak-
ing certain that the partnership creditors and the pur-
chaser of the busine'ss (Blackburn) had 1nade satisfactory 
arrangen1ents to take care of the pa y1nen t of this o bliga-
tion. The plaintiffs could have refused to extend or 
alter the ter1ns of the obligation and have sued Kemp 
at tliat time.. They chose to 1nake a new agreement with 
Blackburn because they wanted lumber more than they 
wanted the money. They extended the obligation twice to 
allow Blackburn to deliver the lumber. Blackburn wa:s 
unable to get the lumber out that summer. Not until after 
Blackburn had died the following 'v}nter did the plain-
tiffs decide to pursue the old partners. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence given by the pl'aintiffs the1nselve'S con-
clusively shows tltat: 
1. The defendant partnership was dissolved after 
the loan was made in Septe1nber, 1950. 
2. The business was sold to G. E. Blackburn who 
assumed the debts of the partnership. 
3. The plaintiffs knew of this arrangement and 
thereafter consented to a material alteration in the na-
ture and time of payment of the obligation. 
15 
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The result of their so doing is that the defendant 
Kemp was discharged from liability on the old partner-
ship debt and the judgment of the lower court was in. 
error and should be reversed. 
Respe.ctfully submitted, 
MOSS & HYDE 
By --------------------------------------- -~-- -----------
Attorneys for Defendants ood 
A ppellaJYbt, LaVell Kemp 
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